Many writers in various fields--philosophy, religion, literature, and psychology--believe that the question of the meaning of life is one of the most significant problems that an individual faces. In The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, E.D. Klemke collects some of the best writings on this topic, primarily works by philosophers but also selections from literary figures and religious thinkers. The twenty-seven cogent, readable essays are organized around three different perspectives on the meaning of life. In Part I, the readings assert (...) and defend the theistic view that without the existence of God--or faith in God--life has no significance or purpose. In Part II the selections deny this thesis, defending instead the humanistic alternative--that life has or can have meaning and worth without any theistic beliefs or commitment. In the final group of readings, contributors ask if the question of the meaning of life is in itself legitimate and significant. The volume also includes an introduction by the editor and a selected bibliography. This new edition adds essays by A. J. Ayer, Hazel Barnes, William Lane Craig, Owen Flanagan, Antony Flew, Thomas Nagel, Kai Nielsen, Philip L. Quinn, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Walter T. Stace. The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy and human nature. It also provides an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject for general readers. (shrink)

The contemporary secular student approaching the traditional summit of philosophy, like a candidate approaching an exalted political office, is troubled by the question: ‘Is its future now behind it?’ Seven centuries ago an over-loyal witness to the virtue of St. Thomas anticipated the question with a hyperbolic flourish: “in fine conclusit, quod idem Fr. Thomas in scripturis suis imposuit finem omnibus laborantibus usque ad finem saeculi, et quod omnes deinceps frustra laborarent”. He was promptly contradicted by lively divisions (...) within Scholasticism itself and later by the unexpected and rich development of secular philosophies, whose wars have ended by generating a general suspicion of the validity and position of metaphysics itself. The problem now is to restore a respected significance to that surviving science, as is bluntly stated by Dr. Owens: “the difficulty to-day for metaphysics is to take even the first step toward a proper place in the advanced and complicated culture which is ours”. (shrink)

The contemporary secular student approaching the traditional summit of philosophy, like a candidate approaching an exalted political office, is troubled by the question: ‘Is its future now behind it?’ Seven centuries ago an over-loyal witness to the virtue of St. Thomas anticipated the question with a hyperbolic flourish: “in fine conclusit, quod idem Fr. Thomas in scripturis suis imposuit finem omnibus laborantibus usque ad finem saeculi, et quod omnes deinceps frustra laborarent”. He was promptly contradicted by lively divisions (...) within Scholasticism itself and later by the unexpected and rich development of secular philosophies, whose wars have ended by generating a general suspicion of the validity and position of metaphysics itself. The problem now is to restore a respected significance to that surviving science, as is bluntly stated by Dr. Owens: “the difficulty to-day for metaphysics is to take even the first step toward a proper place in the advanced and complicated culture which is ours”. (shrink)

The argument for unifying behavioral sciences can be enhanced by highlighting concrete, vivid, and useful benefits that coherent behavioral models could provide. Shifting sets of behavioral assumptions underlie every legal system's efforts to modify behaviors by changing incentives in the legal environment. Consequently, where those assumptions are flawed, improved behavioral models could improve law's effectiveness and efficiency in regulating behavior. (Published Online April 27 2007).

Coursebook on law and neuroscience, including the bearing of neuroscience on criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence.

A comprehensive evidentiary regime that would encompass adaptations, exaptations, spandrels, and constraints requires both a standard to be satisfied and a predesignated default presumption to be maintained before the standard is satisfied. Andrews et al. focus principally on the former component. Some thoughts are here offered on the latter.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76 AN UNNOTICED ERROR IN HUME'S TREATISE "...the conformity between love and hatred in the agreeableness of their sensation makes them always be excited by the same objects..." Treatise, Book II, Part II, Sec. X. This passage from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is taken from the first edition of 1739. It can also be found in the Everyman Edition, the editions of Selby-Bigge Mossner, and Green and (...) Grosse, without editorial comment of any kind. Yet it contains a glaring and obvious error. The most superficial reading of Book II will convince one that it is love and pride that conform in the agreeableness of their sensation they are both indirect passions that aire pleasant in feeling. On the other hand, humility and hatred share in being disagree able or unpleasant impressions. This might have been a printer's error, or Hume's own mistake, and the reason for it is not hard to find. This part of Book II was called "Of love and hatred" ; the expression "love and hatred" recurs several times throughout the whole. In ei»ther the writing of the manuscript or the type setting of the text, a habit was established. Habit, which Hume himself used to explain so much else, must here be cited as the explanation of this slip. What is more interesting is the reason why such an obvious error has gone so long unnoticed. Here an ambiguity in Hume's use of the word "object" should be noticed. It is sometimes used simply as a synonym for "thing" and this is the usage in "excited by the same objects". Hume is merely saying that love and pride have the same sorts of cause. When this cause is found in oneself it leads to pride and when in another it leads to love. This of course is connected with the fact that both these passions are aggreeable or pleasant in sensation. 77 "Object" also has a special technical use in Book II when it refers to the person towards whom the passion is directed, as in "the object of the passion". Now love and hatred do have a similar sort of object, i.e. another person, whereas the object of pride and humility is, according to Hume, always oneself. In this usage, the object of a passion is carefully distinguished by Hume from its cause. It is possible that a careless and superficial reading of this passage might lead one to think that Hume meant to say that love and hatred agree in having the same sort of object, i.e. another person. Such inattention is to be deplored, but after all, until very recently, such inattention was typical of the attitude of philosophers towards Book II 2 as a whole. D. W. D. Owen University of Stirling 1.See for instance the previous paragraph; "I have suppos'd all along, that the passions of love and pride, and those of humility and hatred are similar in their sensations, and that the two former are always agreeable, and the two latter painful." 2.Thanks are due to Mr. Roland Hall for checking the first edition on my behalf.... (shrink)

In this paper, we study the relationship between the cofinalityc(Sym(ω)) of the infinite symmetric group and the minimal cardinality $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\thicksim}$}}{b} $$ of an unbounded familyF of ω ω.

Assuming Martin's Axiom, we compute the value of the cofinality of the symmetric group on the natural numbers. We also show that Martin's Axiom does not decide the value of the covering number of a related Mycielski ideal.

The basic methods that have been used for describing bound-state quantum electrodynamics are described and critically discussed. These include the external field approximation, the quasi-potential approaches, the effective potential approach, the Bethe–Salpeter method, and the three-dimensional equations of Lepage and other workers. Other methods less frequently used but of some intrinsic interest such as applications of the Duffin–Kemmer equation are also described. A comparison of the strengths and shortcomings of these various approaches is included.

Conflicts have arisen between communities and operators of confined animal feeding as farms have become bigger in order to maintain their competitiveness. These conflicts have been difficult to resolve because measuring and allocating the benefits and costs of livestock production is difficult. This papers demonstrates a policy tool for promoting compromise whereby the community gets reduced negative impacts from livestock while at the same time continues to benefit from livestock jobs, taxes, and related economic activity. Public economic benefits and public (...) economic costs of confined animal feeding operations are estimated for every farm and affected house in Craven County, North Carolina. The results show public economic benefits of $5.7 million and public economic costs of $2.2 million, but that the ratio of benefits to costs for individual farm-house pairs varies in important ways across the 26 hog farms in Craven County. (shrink)

We suggest a new view of secretory and membrane protein folding that emphasizes the role of pathways of biogenesis in generating functional and conformational heterogeneity. In this view, heterogeneity results from action of accessory factors either directly binding specific sequences of the nascent chain, or indirectly, changing the environment in which a particular domain is synthesized. Entrained by signaling pathways, these variables create a combinatorial set of necessary‐but‐not‐sufficient conditions that enhance synthesis and folding of particular alternate, functional, conformational forms. We (...) therefore propose that protein conformation is productively regulated by the cell during translocation across the endoplasmic reticulum (ER), a concept that may account for currently poorly understood aspects of physiological function, natural selection, and disease pathogenesis. BioEssays 24:741–748, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)